# Container Management Tool Security Threat Catalog (ThreatCatalog).
# Conforms to Gemara #ThreatCatalog (threatcatalog.cue); gemara-version matches schema tag.
# Scope-specific capabilities live in capabilities.yaml (CapabilityCatalog).
# See threat-assessment-guide.md.

title: Container Management Tool Security Threat Catalog

metadata:
  id: SEC.SLAM.CM
  type: ThreatCatalog
  gemara-version: "1.2.0"
  description: Threat catalog for container management tool security assessment
  version: 1.0.0
  author:
    id: example
    name: Example
    type: Human
  mapping-references:
    - id: CCC
      title: Common Cloud Controls Core
      version: v2025.10
      url: https://github.com/finos/common-cloud-controls/releases
      description: |
        Foundational repository of reusable security controls, capabilities,
        and threat models maintained by FINOS.
    - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP
      title: Container Management Tool Security Capability Catalog
      version: "1.0.0"
      url: https://example.org/catalogs/SEC.SLAM.CM-capabilities.yaml
      description: |
        Scope-specific capabilities (CAP01, CAP02) for this threat assessment.

groups:
  - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.FAM01
    title: Image integrity and supply chain
    description: |
      Threats affecting container image retrieval, integrity, and trust.

imports:
  - reference-id: CCC
    entries:
      - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP29
        remarks: Active Ingestion
      - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP18
        remarks: Resource Versioning
      - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP01
        remarks: Encryption in Transit Enabled by Default
      - reference-id: CCC.Core.TH14
        remarks: Older Resource Versions are Used
      - reference-id: CCC.Core.TH02
        remarks: Related transit / interception threat from CCC Core

threats:
  - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.THR01
    title: Container Image Tampering or Poisoning
    description: |
      Attackers may replace a legitimately published image tag with a malicious image
      by exploiting tag mutability in image registries, especially when the container
      management tool retrieves images by tag name rather than digest. This enables
      unauthorized access, data exfiltration, and system compromise.
    group: SEC.SLAM.CM.FAM01
    capabilities:
      - reference-id: CCC
        entries:
          - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP29
          - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP18
      - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP
        entries:
          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP01

  - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.THR02
    title: MITM Container Image Interception
    description: |
      Attackers redirect the client to an unauthorized or malicious mirror so that
      image pulls (or other artifact downloads) fetch compromised artifacts instead
      of the intended ones—via DNS spoofing, MITM, or compromise of resolution or
      redirect. The client believes it is pulling from the trusted vendor but is
      served malware or tampered images.
    group: SEC.SLAM.CM.FAM01
    capabilities:
      - reference-id: CCC
        entries:
          - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP29
          - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP01
      - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP
        entries:
          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP01
          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP02

  - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.THR03
    title: TOCTOU Attacks during time-of-check-time-of-use
    description: |
      Attackers exploit the gap between when the container management tool (or
      pipeline) validates an image and when it is used: they modify the resource
      after the check and before use (e.g. replacing the image in cache, swapping
      the file on disk, or changing what a tag resolves to) so the tool runs or
      distributes a malicious image that bypassed the check, leading to compromised
      workloads, credential theft, or supply chain poisoning.
    group: SEC.SLAM.CM.FAM01
    capabilities:
      - reference-id: CCC
        entries:
          - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP29
          - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP18
      - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP
        entries:
          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP01
          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP02

  - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.THR04
    title: Supply chain compromise from tag substitution
    description: |
      Attackers substitute the content behind a mutable tag (e.g. "latest", "v1.0")
      by retagging a malicious image or publishing under the same tag after the
      legitimate one, so that consumers who pull by tag receive a malicious artifact.
      CI/CD and deployments that use tags (rather than digests) pull the substituted
      artifact, introducing malware, backdoors, or credential theft into the supply chain.
    group: SEC.SLAM.CM.FAM01
    capabilities:
      - reference-id: CCC
        entries:
          - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP29
          - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP18
      - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP
        entries:
          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP01
          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP02

  - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.THR05
    title: Container Registry Typosquatting
    description: |
      Attackers register container image or registry names that closely mimic
      legitimate ones (typos, homoglyphs, character omission or transposition) so
      that users or automation accidentally pull a malicious image instead of the
      intended one, leading to malware, credential theft, or backdoors.
    group: SEC.SLAM.CM.FAM01
    capabilities:
      - reference-id: CCC
        entries:
          - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP29
          - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP18
      - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP
        entries:
          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP01
          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP02