1# Container Management Tool Security Threat Catalog (ThreatCatalog).
  2# Conforms to Gemara #ThreatCatalog (threatcatalog.cue); gemara-version matches schema tag.
  3# Scope-specific capabilities live in capabilities.yaml (CapabilityCatalog).
  4# See threat-assessment-guide.md.
  5
  6title: Container Management Tool Security Threat Catalog
  7
  8metadata:
  9  id: SEC.SLAM.CM
 10  type: ThreatCatalog
 11  gemara-version: "1.2.0"
 12  description: Threat catalog for container management tool security assessment
 13  version: 1.0.0
 14  author:
 15    id: example
 16    name: Example
 17    type: Human
 18  mapping-references:
 19    - id: CCC
 20      title: Common Cloud Controls Core
 21      version: v2025.10
 22      url: https://github.com/finos/common-cloud-controls/releases
 23      description: |
 24        Foundational repository of reusable security controls, capabilities,
 25        and threat models maintained by FINOS.
 26    - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP
 27      title: Container Management Tool Security Capability Catalog
 28      version: "1.0.0"
 29      url: https://example.org/catalogs/SEC.SLAM.CM-capabilities.yaml
 30      description: |
 31        Scope-specific capabilities (CAP01, CAP02) for this threat assessment.
 32
 33groups:
 34  - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.FAM01
 35    title: Image integrity and supply chain
 36    description: |
 37      Threats affecting container image retrieval, integrity, and trust.
 38
 39imports:
 40  - reference-id: CCC
 41    entries:
 42      - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP29
 43        remarks: Active Ingestion
 44      - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP18
 45        remarks: Resource Versioning
 46      - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP01
 47        remarks: Encryption in Transit Enabled by Default
 48      - reference-id: CCC.Core.TH14
 49        remarks: Older Resource Versions are Used
 50      - reference-id: CCC.Core.TH02
 51        remarks: Related transit / interception threat from CCC Core
 52
 53threats:
 54  - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.THR01
 55    title: Container Image Tampering or Poisoning
 56    description: |
 57      Attackers may replace a legitimately published image tag with a malicious image
 58      by exploiting tag mutability in image registries, especially when the container
 59      management tool retrieves images by tag name rather than digest. This enables
 60      unauthorized access, data exfiltration, and system compromise.
 61    group: SEC.SLAM.CM.FAM01
 62    capabilities:
 63      - reference-id: CCC
 64        entries:
 65          - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP29
 66          - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP18
 67      - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP
 68        entries:
 69          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP01
 70
 71  - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.THR02
 72    title: MITM Container Image Interception
 73    description: |
 74      Attackers redirect the client to an unauthorized or malicious mirror so that
 75      image pulls (or other artifact downloads) fetch compromised artifacts instead
 76      of the intended ones—via DNS spoofing, MITM, or compromise of resolution or
 77      redirect. The client believes it is pulling from the trusted vendor but is
 78      served malware or tampered images.
 79    group: SEC.SLAM.CM.FAM01
 80    capabilities:
 81      - reference-id: CCC
 82        entries:
 83          - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP29
 84          - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP01
 85      - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP
 86        entries:
 87          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP01
 88          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP02
 89
 90  - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.THR03
 91    title: TOCTOU Attacks during time-of-check-time-of-use
 92    description: |
 93      Attackers exploit the gap between when the container management tool (or
 94      pipeline) validates an image and when it is used: they modify the resource
 95      after the check and before use (e.g. replacing the image in cache, swapping
 96      the file on disk, or changing what a tag resolves to) so the tool runs or
 97      distributes a malicious image that bypassed the check, leading to compromised
 98      workloads, credential theft, or supply chain poisoning.
 99    group: SEC.SLAM.CM.FAM01
100    capabilities:
101      - reference-id: CCC
102        entries:
103          - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP29
104          - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP18
105      - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP
106        entries:
107          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP01
108          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP02
109
110  - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.THR04
111    title: Supply chain compromise from tag substitution
112    description: |
113      Attackers substitute the content behind a mutable tag (e.g. "latest", "v1.0")
114      by retagging a malicious image or publishing under the same tag after the
115      legitimate one, so that consumers who pull by tag receive a malicious artifact.
116      CI/CD and deployments that use tags (rather than digests) pull the substituted
117      artifact, introducing malware, backdoors, or credential theft into the supply chain.
118    group: SEC.SLAM.CM.FAM01
119    capabilities:
120      - reference-id: CCC
121        entries:
122          - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP29
123          - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP18
124      - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP
125        entries:
126          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP01
127          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP02
128
129  - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.THR05
130    title: Container Registry Typosquatting
131    description: |
132      Attackers register container image or registry names that closely mimic
133      legitimate ones (typos, homoglyphs, character omission or transposition) so
134      that users or automation accidentally pull a malicious image instead of the
135      intended one, leading to malware, credential theft, or backdoors.
136    group: SEC.SLAM.CM.FAM01
137    capabilities:
138      - reference-id: CCC
139        entries:
140          - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP29
141          - reference-id: CCC.Core.CP18
142      - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP
143        entries:
144          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP01
145          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CAP02